តើ​ទំនាក់ទំនង​ថៃ-ចិន​នឹង​មាន​ស្ថានភាព​បែបណា​នៅ​ឆ្នាំ ២០២៦?

 This year is set to witness a flowering of relations between Bangkok and Beijing – but Thai strategists remain both ambivalent and wary.

Thailand’s Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow has garnered significant attention with his latest interview with The Washington Post, in which he expressed unambiguous opposition to the United States’ war with Iran and spoke favorably about China and Russia. China is, of course, the bigger partner for Thailand, with many existing indicators of closeness spanning trade, political leadership, socio-cultural ties, and defense.

April alone has seen many good developments in Thailand-China ties, sustaining the momentum from last year’s Golden Jubilee celebration of their modern diplomatic relations. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was just in Thailand last week, where he stopped in Bangkok and the southern resort province of Krabi for high-level talks. Ahead of his trip, Chinese Ambassador to Thailand Zhang Jianwei was apparently the first foreign envoy to pay a courtesy call on Thailand’s new defense minister, Lt. Gen. Adul Boonthamcharoen.

Beyond the official circles, the 47th Bangkok International Motor Show saw China’s BYD – the very brand endorsed by Thailand’s Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul for personal use and for chauffeuring Foreign Minister Wang – topping the booking numbers, beating the long-favored Toyota from Japan. In fact, eight of the top ten most booked car brands were Chinese-owned.

Thailand-China ties look set to blossom. First, there is a clearer convergence of interests. Both Thailand and China are highly reliant on oil imports, and the “new normal” of disruptions surrounding maritime chokepoints unites them in accelerating the transition toward clean energy as well as searching for alternative suppliers and trade routes.

For Thailand’s government, the “land bridge” megaproject to transport goods between two deep-sea ports at the opposite ends of the Thai national coasts, connecting the Indian and Pacific oceans via railroads, is increasingly framed less as a soft policy preference and more as an insurance for strategic independence (subject to cautious management). Striving to lower reliance on the Strait of Malacca since the early 2000s, when the then Chinese President Hu Jintao introduced the expression “Malacca dilemma,” China stands among the most probable backers of Thailand’s land bridge, whether diplomatically or financially.

Second, as Foreign Minister Sihasak stressed, China’s predictability is prized more than ever. This could foster a closer correlation between practical cooperation and trust levels, which do not necessarily move in lockstep. One could reasonably assume that Thailand already has a great deal of trust in China. This is because their problems revolve around the more fluid and positive-sum – however serious – economic and security issues, such as trade deficits and  water governance in the Mekong River, and not the inherently zero-sum matters of territorial disputes and historical trauma.

That the Thailand-China relationship today is free of historical trauma might be met with skepticism, considering that Thailand’s entrenched nationalist narrative of “14 territorial losses” between the late eighteenth and twentieth centuries includes the loss of Sibsongpanna (Xishuangbanna) to China. One counterargument, leaving aside the debate over whether Sibsongpanna was ever part of the Thai state, would be that such a loss was not dictated by unequal treaties in a manner similar to Thailand’s dealings with Western imperial powers. Looking back some four centuries earlier, Thailand was never subject to Chinese invasion, nor is China’s Tributary System recalled today as oppressive.

Thai sentiments are, however, far more complicated upon closer inspection and with reference to the recently published ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute’s State of Southeast Asia 2026 Survey. Despite recording improved Thai confidence since 2025 that China is a responsible power that will “do the right thing” for the global community, the survey also captures a stronger Thai instinct to repel China’s expanding influence.

Thailand takes the crown as the wariest in Southeast Asia of China’s growing economic clout, with a 90.6 percent rate of apprehension. Whereas every other regional state records a double-digit figure in welcoming China’s increasing economic influence, only 9.4 percent of Thais approve of this. Likewise, on China’s growing political and strategic influence, Thailand joins the Philippines (87.5 percent) as the region’s second most worried after Vietnam (88.7 percent). A leap in Thai concern over China’s militarization and assertive actions in the South China Sea, accounting for 40.4 percent in 2026 compared to 28.1 percent in 2025, is noteworthy. Not only is Thailand a non-claimant state with a peripheral role in the South China Sea issue, but the survey detects no dramatic jumps in other nations’ responses – not even the Philippines, the main character at the center of last year’s intensified maritime confrontation.

A useful starting point to understand Thailand’s elevated ambivalence is to consider China’s approach to international relations. A recent Foreign Affairs article by Zongyuan Zoe Liu sheds light on China’s preference: maintaining a watchful eye and making calculated moves without destabilizing the status quo to gradually yet surely gain advantages – something poetically in line with Mao Zedong’s idea of strategic patience. For Thailand, this offers comfort but also creates a sense of paranoia. Unlike the West’s more overt reaches with greater political strings attached, subtle Chinese advances are harder to detect and guard against, even more so for Thailand that has been struggling with structural reforms needed to boost growth and strengthen law enforcement.

Furthermore, as much as China may not have the intention to directly harm Thai interests, the sheer scale of Chinese influence in Thailand’s immediate neighborhood – and hence areas of key interest – makes friction unavoidable, including in hard security terms now that border security in tandem with heightened nationalism takes universal precedence. For one, there has been more Thai scrutiny of China’s military aid to governments and ethnic armed organizations in Cambodia and Myanmar. Cambodia’s acquisition of two gifted Chinese Type 056C corvettes – the first of which was delivered early this month – has notably altered a naval balance that has long been in Thailand’s undisputed favor.

Finally, even if the “spheres of influence” are manifesting more plainly and even if China’s leadership is regionally welcomed, the U.S. retains enormous material power. To quote the realist scholar Stephen Walt, “other states still have to worry that U.S. power could be used to harm them either intentionally or inadvertently.” Getting too close to China could invite trouble, especially when Thailand still carries the tage of U.S. ally. As its skyrocketing concern over China’s South China Sea militarization suggests, Thailand seems to view the situation through a classic security dilemma lens and the “Thucydides Trap” logic that any growth in Chinese power could dangerously fuel American responses.

These sources of Thailand’s ambivalence toward China will not fade away any time soon. As such, we can expect the widening gaps – or at least constant fluctuations – between the levels of Thailand-China functional cooperation and the actual levels of trust.

thediplomat