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ប្រទេសថៃនិយាយលាហើយចំពោះ «ស្ពានដីគោក» — សម្រាប់ពេលនេះ

A government feasibility study found what many already expected: that the project’s financial returns did not justify the massive capital outlay. In late April, Sebastian Strangio and I penned separate articles for The Diplomat highlighting how Thailand’s ambition to build a “land bridge” across its upper southern provinces as an alternative trade route to the Strait of Malacca – via two deep-sea ports linked by a dual-track railway and a six-lane motorway – was increasingly framed by Thai leaders as an imperative amid deepening geopolitical volatility. What we said lost relevance quickly, with the shelving of the one-trillion-baht megaproject coming to light on July 24. The announcement was made verbally by Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Ekniti Nitithanprapas, citing unfavorable findings in a government feasibility study. Just as too many skeptics have loudly reasoned, the projected financial return does not look promising. The operational requirement to repeatedly load an...
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បញ្ជាការដ្ឋានកាំភ្លើងធំ-មីស៊ីល៖ ចម្លើយរបស់វៀតណាមចំពោះភាពលំបាកខាងសមុទ្រ-ទ្វីប

Long-range surface-to-surface and ground-based anti-ship missiles will help defend the country on both land and sea. Vietnam’s military modernization is setting off in a new direction. Instead of procuring naval platforms such as submarines or frigates to defend its South China Sea claims, as it did in the 2010s, the country is looking to upgrade and acquire long-range surface-to-surface and ground-based anti-ship missiles (ASMs) to guard against both continental and maritime threats. A number of recent developments show that this is the case. First, Vietnam established the Artillery-Missile Command based on the Artillery Corps in August of last year. The Command was intended to be leaner, given expanded duties, and equipped with more advanced weaponry. Second, it introduced the domestically produced shore-based ASM system Truong Son and showed off the Scud-B tactical ballistic missiles procured from the Soviet Union in the 1980s, on the 80th anniversary of Vietnam’s founding. Hanoi al...
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ការបដិសេធការជ្រៀតជ្រែករបស់មហាអំណាច៖ យុទ្ធសាស្ត្ររបស់វៀតណាមចំពោះឡាវ និងកម្ពុជា

Denying Great Power Interference: Vietnam’s Strategies Toward Laos and Cambodia During the Q&A following his address at the 2026 Shangri-La Dialogue, To Lam, Vietnam’s president and the general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), made a commitment that, despite its rising profile, Vietnam would not seek to become a “center of power” in Southeast Asia. Observers of Vietnam’s foreign policy cannot help contrasting the commitment with Vietnam’s attempt to head an Indochinese bloc comprising of Laos and Cambodia confronting the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) during the Cold War. Instead of siding with a great power and weakening ASEAN then, Vietnam now affirms its Four Nos foreign policy (no military alliances, no siding with one country against another, no letting foreign powers set up military bases in Vietnam or use Vietnamese territory against another, no use or threat of use of force in international relations) and advocates for “ASEAN centrality.” ...
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តើ​ទំនាក់ទំនង​ថៃ-ចិន​នឹង​មាន​ស្ថានភាព​បែបណា​នៅ​ឆ្នាំ ២០២៦?

 This year is set to witness a flowering of relations between Bangkok and Beijing – but Thai strategists remain both ambivalent and wary. Thailand’s Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow has garnered significant attention with his latest interview with The Washington Post, in which he expressed unambiguous opposition to the United States’ war with Iran and spoke favorably about China and Russia. China is, of course, the bigger partner for Thailand, with many existing indicators of closeness spanning trade, political leadership, socio-cultural ties, and defense. April alone has seen many good developments in Thailand-China ties, sustaining the momentum from last year’s Golden Jubilee celebration of their modern diplomatic relations. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was just in Thailand last week, where he stopped in Bangkok and the southern resort province of Krabi for high-level talks . Ahead of his trip, Chinese Ambassador to Thailand Zhang Jianwei was apparently the first foreig...
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កង្វាល់នៃភូមិសាស្រ្ត : របស់ទីក្រុងហាណូយនិងក្រុងបាងកក

 ឥទ្ធិពលដែលកំពុងពង្រីករបស់ចិននៅក្នុងប្រទេសកម្ពុជា និងឡាវ ដែលជាសង្វៀនប្រវត្តិសាស្ត្រនៃការប្រកួតប្រជែងនៅឥណ្ឌូចិន ។ ចំពោះមេដឹកនាំវៀតណាមជាច្រើន កម្ពុជានិងឡាវ  គឺជាចំណុចកណ្តាលនៃការរស់រានមានជីវិតរបស់ពួកគេ។ នៅក្នុងចិត្តគំនិតរបស់វៀតណាម ប្រទេសថៃតំណាងឱ្យដែនកំណត់នៃការពង្រីកខ្លួននៅភាគខាងលិចរបស់វៀតណាម តាមរបៀបដូចគ្នានឹងប្រទេសចិនបង្កើតរបាំងភាគខាងជើង។ ឡាវ និងកម្ពុជា ដែលមានភាពទន់ខ្សោយដោយធម្មជាតិ អាចបង្កការគំរាមកំហែងដល់វៀតណាមបានលុះត្រាតែពួកគេត្រូវបានគាំទ្រដោយចិន ។ កិច្ចព្រមព្រៀងរវាងថៃ និងវៀតណាមលើបញ្ហា កម្ពុជា  និង ឡាវ  នឹងផ្តល់ឱកាសឱ្យពួកគេដោះស្រាយបញ្ហាប្រឈមមុខដាក់គ្នារវាងប្រទេសទាំងពីរ។  ចំពោះប្រទេសថៃ នោះមានន័យថា ការបង្វែរការយកចិត្តទុកដាក់ទៅកាន់តំបន់ខាងលិចជាមួយប្រទេសមីយ៉ាន់ម៉ា ជាកន្លែងដែលព្រំដែនដ៏វែង និងងាយជ្រាបចូល តួអង្គប្រដាប់អាវុធកាន់តែច្រើន និងលំហូរជនភៀសខ្លួនទាមទារការផ្តោតអារម្មណ៍ច្រើនជាងព្រំដែនជាមួយប្រទេសកម្ពុជា។  ចំណែកឯប្រទេសវៀតណាមវិញ នឹងមានជំហរល្អប្រសើរជាងមុនក្នុងការ បង្វែរទិសដៅ ទៅទិសខាងកើតទៅកាន់សមុទ្រចិនខាងត្បូង ជាកន្លែងដែលការធ្វើទំនើបកម្មកងទ័ពជើងទឹក និងយុទ្ធនាការទាមទ...
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អ្នកជិតខាងល្អបង្កើតរបងល្អ៖ មូលដ្ឋានយុទ្ធសាស្ត្រសម្រាប់កិច្ចព្រមព្រៀងថៃ-វៀតណាម

 Both Bangkok and Hanoi share concerns about China’s expanding influence in Laos and Cambodia, a historic arena of strategic competition between the two powers. The latest encroachment by Cambodian troops into the disputed areas along the country’s border with Thailand around the “Emerald Triangle,” resulting in the exchange of fire and the death of a Cambodian soldier in late May, has added to Thailand’s growing two-front insecurity. Besides the emotionally charged nationalist tensions with Cambodia over the question of territorial sovereignty on the eastern border, the threat of spillover from Myanmar’s bloody civil war on the western front has become a new normal. Despite Thailand’s clear superiority in material capabilities, the time and energy needed to deal with these immediate neighbors simultaneously can be deeply draining. As such, easing pressure on one border to focus on the other would benefit Thailand in the long run, and Vietnam – with its own dual-front dilemma and ...
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ហេតុអ្វីបានជាគោលនយោបាយការបរទេសមិនចូលបក្សសម្ព័ន្ធរបស់វៀតណាមតម្រូវឱ្យមានកិច្ចសហប្រតិបត្តិការពីប្រទេសថៃ?

Mainland Southeast Asia’s strategic equilibrium ultimately rests on the mutually reinforcing foreign policy approaches of Hanoi and Bangkok. Vietnam’s “ Four Nos ” doctrine – which commits it to no military alliances, no siding with one country against another, no foreign military bases on Vietnamese soil, and no use of force or threat of use of force in international relations – is often interpreted as the backbone of the country’s policy of non-alignment in the current phase of intensifying great power competition. However, the recent Cambodia-Thailand border conflict reveals a no less important aspect of the policy, which is that Hanoi also seeks to be non-aligned with regard to disputes among its peer neighbors, except for Vietnam’s sole treaty ally Laos. This is a huge policy reversal compared to the heyday of the Third Indochina War (1977-1991), when Hanoi backed the People’s Republic of Kampuchea in its border clash with Thailand, partially resulting in Vietnam being internatio...
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