the Franco–Siamese Treaty of 1907

 Hanoi likely to view the Ban Keun facility as Beijing’s bid to ‘encroach into its area of influence’ in Vientiane, analysts say A newly opened China-backed air force training centre in Laos could unsettle Vietnam, even as it aims to modernise Vientiane’s military and balance defence ties among Beijing, Moscow and Hanoi, observers say. China’s National Defence Ministry said last Tuesday that the joint support and training facility at Ban Keun Airport in the Laotian capital would strengthen the expertise of local air force pilots and was “not directed against any third party”. “The establishment and operation of the two institutions reflect mutual respect and equal consultation between China and Laos, aligning with domestic laws of both countries, as well as international law and common practices,” the ministry said in a statement. It added that the installation, widely described as China’s third overseas defence base, “contributes to enhancing practical military cooperation, as wel...

 The quick pace of reconciliation between Tokyo and Hanoi since the end of the Cold War has reflected the compatibility of their respective grand strategies. In an address to Vietnam National University in Hanoi in May, Japan’s Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae affirmed Japan’s commitment to the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) concept. Tokyo pledged to increase its political, economic, and defense cooperation with ASEAN so that each ASEAN state can “acquire autonomy and resilience” in the face of intensifying geopolitical competition. It was Takaichi’s first public address on updating her predecessor Abe Shinzo’s FOIP vision, and her decision to deliver it in Vietnam says a lot about the current state of Japan-Vietnam ties. The reconciliation between Japan and Vietnam since the end of the Cold War has been nothing short of extraordinary. During the Third Indochina War (1978-1991), Japan sided with China and the United States to isolate Vietnam due to its status as a Soviet ally. Jap...

 The past year has seen considerable steps forward in the country’s relationships with Singapore and Indonesia. Varying degrees of dependence – and interdependence – dictate how Thailand approaches its neighbors. Attention naturally fixates on adjacent states, not least because the poorly demarcated frontiers of mainland Southeast Asia are a hotspot for armed confrontation and illicit businesses. Drug trafficking, cyber scam operations, and unregulated rare earth mining are all concentrated in this sub-region. But now is an opportune time to reflect on Thailand’s low-friction dynamics with Singapore and Indonesia, given their recent diplomatic momentum amid mounting global supply chain risks, and the Thai government’s pursuit of a more proactive foreign policy aimed at better communicating national interests. Early this month, Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul and Singaporean Prime Minister Lawrence Wong met in Bangkok for the fifth Thailand-Singapore Leaders’ Retreat – the h...

  Compulsory conciliation under UNCLOS could help both sides insulate sensitive negotiations from domestic political pressure.     The Gulf of Thailand forms the second axis of the Cambodia-Thai border dispute. The 27,000-square-kilometer Overlapping Claims Area has been disputed since 1972 and is estimated to hold some 1.6 billion barrels of oil and 17 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Thailand terminated the 2001 memorandum of understanding governing talks over the OCA in early 2026, after fighting along the two nations’ disputed land border in July and December 2025. The outbreak of war reignited historic territorial and political animosities between the two Southeast Asian states and resulted in a border closure that still persists. The immediate cause of the fighting was a calculated political leak by Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen of a private 17-minute telephone conversation with Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra. The recording exposed Paetongtarn ad...

 The process, convened under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, follows Thailand’s revocation of a 2001 MoU governing bilateral maritime talks. Cambodia and Thailand began compulsory conciliation proceedings in Singapore yesterday, aimed at resolving a long-running maritime dispute. The three-day session marks the opening of a process conducted under Article 298 and Annex V of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which is intended to resolve the two nations’ overlapping claims in the Gulf of Thailand. After a closed-door session yesterday that was chaired by Katrina Cooper, the head of the Conciliation Commission, a public session took place today in which the Cambodian and Thai foreign ministers delivered opening statements laying out their governments’ respective positions. Cambodian Foreign Minister Prak Sokhonn told the Commission that his government’s objective was “to achieve a resolution that serves the peoples of both nations and contributes to peace...

A government feasibility study found what many already expected: that the project’s financial returns did not justify the massive capital outlay. In late April, Sebastian Strangio and I penned separate articles for The Diplomat highlighting how Thailand’s ambition to build a “land bridge” across its upper southern provinces as an alternative trade route to the Strait of Malacca – via two deep-sea ports linked by a dual-track railway and a six-lane motorway – was increasingly framed by Thai leaders as an imperative amid deepening geopolitical volatility. What we said lost relevance quickly, with the shelving of the one-trillion-baht megaproject coming to light on July 24. The announcement was made verbally by Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Ekniti Nitithanprapas, citing unfavorable findings in a government feasibility study. Just as too many skeptics have loudly reasoned, the projected financial return does not look promising. The operational requirement to repeatedly load an...