the Franco–Siamese Treaty of 1907

  Compulsory conciliation under UNCLOS could help both sides insulate sensitive negotiations from domestic political pressure.     The Gulf of Thailand forms the second axis of the Cambodia-Thai border dispute. The 27,000-square-kilometer Overlapping Claims Area has been disputed since 1972 and is estimated to hold some 1.6 billion barrels of oil and 17 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Thailand terminated the 2001 memorandum of understanding governing talks over the OCA in early 2026, after fighting along the two nations’ disputed land border in July and December 2025. The outbreak of war reignited historic territorial and political animosities between the two Southeast Asian states and resulted in a border closure that still persists. The immediate cause of the fighting was a calculated political leak by Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen of a private 17-minute telephone conversation with Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra. The recording exposed Paetongtarn ad...

 The process, convened under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, follows Thailand’s revocation of a 2001 MoU governing bilateral maritime talks. Cambodia and Thailand began compulsory conciliation proceedings in Singapore yesterday, aimed at resolving a long-running maritime dispute. The three-day session marks the opening of a process conducted under Article 298 and Annex V of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which is intended to resolve the two nations’ overlapping claims in the Gulf of Thailand. After a closed-door session yesterday that was chaired by Katrina Cooper, the head of the Conciliation Commission, a public session took place today in which the Cambodian and Thai foreign ministers delivered opening statements laying out their governments’ respective positions. Cambodian Foreign Minister Prak Sokhonn told the Commission that his government’s objective was “to achieve a resolution that serves the peoples of both nations and contributes to peace...

A government feasibility study found what many already expected: that the project’s financial returns did not justify the massive capital outlay. In late April, Sebastian Strangio and I penned separate articles for The Diplomat highlighting how Thailand’s ambition to build a “land bridge” across its upper southern provinces as an alternative trade route to the Strait of Malacca – via two deep-sea ports linked by a dual-track railway and a six-lane motorway – was increasingly framed by Thai leaders as an imperative amid deepening geopolitical volatility. What we said lost relevance quickly, with the shelving of the one-trillion-baht megaproject coming to light on July 24. The announcement was made verbally by Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Ekniti Nitithanprapas, citing unfavorable findings in a government feasibility study. Just as too many skeptics have loudly reasoned, the projected financial return does not look promising. The operational requirement to repeatedly load an...

Long-range surface-to-surface and ground-based anti-ship missiles will help defend the country on both land and sea. Vietnam’s military modernization is setting off in a new direction. Instead of procuring naval platforms such as submarines or frigates to defend its South China Sea claims, as it did in the 2010s, the country is looking to upgrade and acquire long-range surface-to-surface and ground-based anti-ship missiles (ASMs) to guard against both continental and maritime threats. A number of recent developments show that this is the case. First, Vietnam established the Artillery-Missile Command based on the Artillery Corps in August of last year. The Command was intended to be leaner, given expanded duties, and equipped with more advanced weaponry. Second, it introduced the domestically produced shore-based ASM system Truong Son and showed off the Scud-B tactical ballistic missiles procured from the Soviet Union in the 1980s, on the 80th anniversary of Vietnam’s founding. Hanoi al...

Denying Great Power Interference: Vietnam’s Strategies Toward Laos and Cambodia During the Q&A following his address at the 2026 Shangri-La Dialogue, To Lam, Vietnam’s president and the general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), made a commitment that, despite its rising profile, Vietnam would not seek to become a “center of power” in Southeast Asia. Observers of Vietnam’s foreign policy cannot help contrasting the commitment with Vietnam’s attempt to head an Indochinese bloc comprising of Laos and Cambodia confronting the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) during the Cold War. Instead of siding with a great power and weakening ASEAN then, Vietnam now affirms its Four Nos foreign policy (no military alliances, no siding with one country against another, no letting foreign powers set up military bases in Vietnam or use Vietnamese territory against another, no use or threat of use of force in international relations) and advocates for “ASEAN centrality.” ...

 This year is set to witness a flowering of relations between Bangkok and Beijing – but Thai strategists remain both ambivalent and wary. Thailand’s Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow has garnered significant attention with his latest interview with The Washington Post, in which he expressed unambiguous opposition to the United States’ war with Iran and spoke favorably about China and Russia. China is, of course, the bigger partner for Thailand, with many existing indicators of closeness spanning trade, political leadership, socio-cultural ties, and defense. April alone has seen many good developments in Thailand-China ties, sustaining the momentum from last year’s Golden Jubilee celebration of their modern diplomatic relations. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was just in Thailand last week, where he stopped in Bangkok and the southern resort province of Krabi for high-level talks . Ahead of his trip, Chinese Ambassador to Thailand Zhang Jianwei was apparently the first foreig...