ជម្លោះព្រំដែនកម្ពុជា-ថៃ៖ ការអត់ធ្មត់ក្នុងសមរភូមិព័ត៌មានឌីជីថល

 Even the shared cultural heritage between Cambodia and Thailand has failed to prevent conflict but instead has become a source of online clashes on social media that fuel nationalism.

The joint statement that Cambodia and Thailand signed on 27 December 2025 to renew the ceasefire includes a clause stating that “both sides agree to refrain from disseminating false information or fake news in order to de-escalate tensions, mitigate negative public sentiment, and foster an environment conducive to peaceful dialogue.”

This clause highlights a constant feature of the Cambodia-Thailand border conflict over the past several months: the hybridity of operations, including narrative warfare in the digital information battlefield. It maintains its momentum even during past ceasefires; in some ways, it is a strategic and operational gap that past ceasefires (which focused on conventional/kinetic operations) failed to address in reducing interstate tensions.

Narrative Warfare in the Digital Information Battlefield

Narrative warfare became more intense when fighting resumed on 8 December 2025 and in the lead-up to the “Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on the Current Situation Between Cambodia and Thailand” in Kuala Lumpur on 22 December 2025, even dragging in the external powers.

For example, the Embassy of Russia in Thailand on 15 December 2025 posted on its Facebook page that news reports about Russian mercenaries fighting for the Cambodian side were false. On 18 December 2025, another external power—China—responded that its arms trade with Cambodia and Thailand is unrelated to the conflict and criticized false information that could affect China’s bilateral relations with both countries.

On the Cambodian side, there were social media posts stating that the reason for self-defense that Thailand used to justify military operations against Cambodia today is similar to the pretext that Thailand used in 1941 to invade Cambodia and declare war on the United Kingdom (U.K.) and the United States (U.S.).

On the Thai side, the media has framed the cross-border bombings in Cambodia as a “war against the scam army”, possibly a tactic to nip the cyber scam threat in the bud and concurrently gain the quiet support of external powers such as the U.S. While the U.S. has placed Cambodian entities and cyber scam syndicates operating in Cambodia on its sanctions list, Cambodian online media has been expressing appreciation and praise for the U.S.’s diplomatic role in easing the border conflict and asserted that Thailand has been ignoring the U.S.’s overtures.

Even the shared cultural heritage between Cambodia and Thailand has failed to prevent conflict but instead has become a source of online clashes on social media that fuel nationalism. This issue expands the narrative of conflict from theft of land, which perpetuates tensions between Cambodian and Thai militaries, to theft to theft of culture, which perpetuates animosity between Cambodian and Thai peoples.

Narrative warfare—using media and online information tools—is crucial for both sides of the conflict to sustain their troops’ willingness to fight, leveraging popular nationalism and historical issues to cast the other side as the recalcitrant enemy, and arguing for the legitimacy of military actions while their domestic and international communities watch the conflict unfold amid the fog of war.

Both sides—Cambodia and Thailand—had also accused each other of disinformation (aka “social cyber threats”) tactics to claim moral standing for their own information operations and national interpretations of the conflict and to challenge or delegitimize their adversary’s narratives. This is expected and tactically necessary from any national viewpoint.

This contest of narratives online exemplifies the character and hybridity of modern warfare seen in military conflicts and grey-zone operations around the world, such as in the Russia-Ukraine war, the Middle East, and the South China Sea. Sadly, this happened at scale between two member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Limitations of ASEAN Regional Security Initiatives

ASEAN has previously developed initiatives to address emerging threats posed by disinformation and fake news. These include (i) the (i) 2022 ADMM-Plus Joint Statement indicating that “ADMM-Plus EWGs should not be exploited with misinformation,” (ii) the 2021 establishment of a Cyber and Information Centre of Excellence for ADMM, and (iii) the 2023 ASEAN Guideline on Management of Government Information in Combating Fake News and Disinformation in the Media.

These initiatives share information among ASEAN countries on threat tactics and trends observed globally to build awareness and facilitate regional capacity building and to promote regional norms—i.e., establishing common standards and best practices—in the dissemination of information to the public.

ASEAN may now be caught in a bind. Its initiatives are not designed to address digital conflict or facilitate reconciliation between its member countries. The ASEAN defense sector (military) and digital sector (civilian) also address disinformation issues through separate workstreams. But in modern warfare, its hybrid character blurs the lines between military and civilian spheres, especially when the media and online commentators and influencers support the military’s strategic aims.

Using such ASEAN-led measures might risk painting one side as belligerent and the other as a defender, which could risk polarizing ASEAN. Furthermore, it is uncertain whether the mandate of the ASEAN Observer Team (AOT) could include impartial fact-checking and verification of competing online information emanating from Cambodia’s and Thailand’s narrative warfare.

Therefore, the inclusion of the clause on “false information or fake news” in the recent joint statement demonstrates wisdom on both sides of the border conflict. It is also a bilateral acknowledgement that restraining narrative warfare in the digital information battlefield is crucial to de-escalating fighting in the physical battlefield.

Conclusion

As the Philippines takes over the chair of ASEAN from Malaysia in 2026, it must engage Cambodia and Thailand closely to ensure that the fragile ceasefire holds and examine whether existing ASEAN-led initiatives on disinformation and fake news could be improved. There is a possibility that the Philippines’ domestic interests could drive the country to focus its ASEAN security agenda on the South China Sea and leave the Cambodia-Thailand border conflict to China and the U.S. to manage.

If fighting resumes again due to Thailand’s accusation on 6 January 2026 that Cambodia has violated the ceasefire and Cambodia’s accusation on 2 January 2026 that Thailand has annexed a border village, the digital information battlefield will likely see another surge in narrative warfare that could perpetuate the cycle of tensions and fighting.

A prolonged cycle of flare-ups at the Cambodia-Thailand border and in the digital information battlefield could further undermine ASEAN unity and regional stability of Southeast Asia, which is already impacted by the prolonged Myanmar crisis and tensions in the South China Sea.

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