Aubaret និងសន្ធិសញ្ញាថ្ងៃទី ១៥ ខែកក្កដា ឆ្នាំ ១៨៦៧ រវាងបារាំង និងសៀម

 AUBARET AND THE TREATY OF JULY 15 1867 BETWEEN FRANCE AND SIAM

LAWRENCE PALMER BRIGGS 

Washington, D. C. 

THE FRENCH IN ANNAM AND COCHIN CHINA, 1856-62

GIALONG (1802-20) owed his throne and the establishment of the Empire of Annam to the assistance of the French, particularly that of the missionary, Pierre Pigneau de Béhaine, Bishop of Adran. At this time the French undoubtedly could have had a protectorate over Annam for the asking, Gialong protected the French and Spanish missionaries during his reign and tried to give the French some trade advantages; but his successors, Ming Mang (1820-41), Thieu-Tri (1841-47), and Tuduc (1847-83), persecuted the missionaries and closed the country to European trade. In 1856, Charles de Montigny, a French diplomat, returning to his post in China, was ordered to make treaties of commerce with Siam and Annam and to secure the protection of the French missionaries in Annam. At Singapore, he received orders to stop at Cambodia, in response to overtures which Ang Duong, king of that country (1842-59), had made toward a French protectorate. In 1856 Montigny made a treaty with Mongkut, king of Siam (1851-68), and although he stopped at the Cambodian seaport of Kampot, he did not visit the capital or make an alliance with Ang Duong, much to that monarch's chagrin. He was badly received at Tourane and Hué and did not succeed in making a treaty of any kind with Annam.

As the Annamites continued to slaughter French and Spanish missionaries, Vice-Admiral Charles Rigault de Genouilly appeared before Tourane in August-September 1858 with a small force and bombarded and captured that port. Not considering an attack on Hué feasible, he passed on to the Mékong delta, where he took Saigon, in February 1859. With his small force, which apparently was not intended to do more than make a demonstration, Admiral Rigault was able to hold only a small fort at Saigon and to control Tourane from the harbor, until he was succeeded by Rear Admiral Théogène Page, in November 1859. Page was instructed to make a treaty, granting freedom to preach the Christian religion, and to secure the right to install consuls in three ports and a chargé d’affaires at the capital, but without asking for territory or other indemnity.² Attempts at negotiation were prolonged and at the end of the year, Page was ordered to rejoin the fleet in China, where the French and English were cooperating in the war against China. He evacuated Tourane and left a small garrison of French and Spanish marines and some Tagalogs from Manila to hold Saigon. In March 1860 this force was attacked by a large force of Annamites, the siege lasting nearly a year. Up to here, there does not seem to have been any demand for territory.

AUBARET AND THE TREATY OF JULY 15, 1867

When peace was finally made with China in 1860, a considerable land and sea force was dispatched to Cochin China under Vice-Admiral Léonard Charner. It reached Saigon in February 1861. Almost immediately, Charner sent an envoy to Cambodia to open friendly relations with that kingdom. As we have seen, Ang Duong’s attempts to secure a French alliance had failed because of Montigny’s blunders. Ang Duong’s son, Norodom (1859-1904), was very pro-Siamese. He had been raised as a hostage at the Siamese court and is said to have preferred Siamese to his native tongue. When Norodom entered the priesthood, as all Hinayanists boys must do for a period, Mongkut (the future king of Siam), then a monk, had been his godfather.³ In 1861, however, Norodom seems to have been willing to listen to French overtures. Charner informed him that the French were in Cochin China to stay and assured him of their friendship.⁴ But the conquest of the delta was slow. The Annamites were well organized and well led and resisted stubbornly. As territory was conquered, Charner appointed French officials, whom he called Directors of Native Affairs, to replace the mandarins of the Annamite phus and huyềns (administrative divisions roughly comparable to French communes and arrondissements). These mandarins had been loyal to Emperor Tuduc and had left as their territory was conquered.

In November 1861 Charner was replaced by Vice-Admiral Louis Bonard. This very intelligent and active officer had had a wide experience, in such places as Algeria, Tahiti, and French Guiana, and had studied the administration of the dependencies of other countries. By June 1862, six provinces had been conquered, and Bonard appointed a general staff to govern them. This consisted of a central bureau, to which was attached a bureau of information on Annamite customs and institutions. At the head of this Bureau of Native Affairs, he named Père Théophile Le Grand de la Liraye, who had been a missionary in Annam for nearly 20 years, had a valuable acquaintance, and knew the language well. Bonard abolished Charner's Directors of Native Affairs and tried to restore the Annamite local government by reviving the phus and huyens, with loyal Annamites in charge, always supervised by a few French Inspectors of Native Affairs, under a Chief Inspector in Saigon. To this important post, he appointed his aide-de-camp, Naval Captain Gabriel Aubaret.

This task was very difficult. It was almost impossible to get Annamites of good standing among their fellows to remain and serve under the French. The work of the young French officers was handicapped by a lack of knowledge of Annamite customs and institutions, so necessary to the establishment of intelligent and sympathetic government. Missionary priests knew and could teach the language, but an exact knowledge of the institutions and customs could be found only in books and manuscripts, generally in the Chinese language and accessible only with difficulty. It is generally considered that this system was not a success, and it was afterward superseded; but it produced a wonderful group of young administrators, explorers, and students of Asiatic affairs. Aubaret, Vial, Harmand, Philastre, Doudart de Lagrée, Garnier, Luro, Delaporte, Moura, Aymonier, Pavie — these are some of the young officers the French Marine set ashore on the coast of Cochin China during the regime of the Admiral-Governors. British and American writers should study the achievements of this matchless group before they conclude — as they sometimes do — that the French lack the aptitude to govern peoples of inferior culture and training.

Gabriel Aubaret was the first of these young officers to perfect himself in the study of the Annamite language and institutions. He had gone to the China coast as a Navy Lieutenant in 1858⁵ and had studied the Chinese language there. He had come to Cochin China with Admiral Charner early in 1861, and before the end of that year he had published an Annamite vocabulary. His translation of the Code Annamite in two volumes (pub-lished in Paris in 1865) bears the preface date of August 1, 1862. His translation from the Chinese of the Histoire et description de la Basse-Cochinchine is dated 1863. He also published an Annamite grammar in 1864. When the Annamites sued for peace, he acted as interpreter in the negotiations between Admiral Bonard and the great Annamite statesman and diplomat, Phan-than-Giang.

The treaty of June 5, 1862 (1) gave French and Spanish missionaries the right to preach and practice their religion throughout Annam, and provided that the Annamites could embrace the Christian religion (Art. 2), (2) ceded the provinces of Bien-hoa, Gia-dinh (Saigon), and Dinh-tuong (Mytho) and the island of Pulo-Condor to France and gave French vessels the right to navigate the Mékong and all its branches (Art. 3), (3) opened the ports of Tourane, Ba-lac and Quang-an to the commerce of France and Spain (Art. 5), and (4) provided that Annam must pay an indemnity of $400,000ᵃ a year for ten years (Art. 8). A period of one year was allowed for ratification, after which exchange of ratifications was to take place at Hué (Art. 12).

THE PHAN-THAN-GIANG MISSION TO PARIS AND THE

VIEWS OF AUBARET, 1863-65

The treaty of June 5, 1862 had not been ratified, and fighting had not ceased when, in December 1862, an Annamite delegation arrived at Saigon with the first payment of the indemnity. They proposed a revision of the treaty, by which the cession of the three provinces should be canceled in return for a large indemnity. This request was not likely to please Admiral Bonard, who had put the article relating to the cession of the provinces into the treaty, without instructions from Paris and against the advice of Aubaret but with the hearty approval of most of the other officers at Saigon and with the unexpressed but understood approval of the Minister of the Marine, the Marquis de Chasseloup-Laubat, and that of Admiral (now Senator) Rigault de Genouilly. Thus matters stood until April 1863 when ratifications arrived from Paris and were exchanged at Hué. Vice-Admiral Bonard left for Paris that same month on sick leave, leaving the command in his absence to Rear Admiral Pierre de Lagrandière. Bonard took with him a copy of the ratified treaty.

But the Annamites were deeply dissatisfied with the cession of the three provinces. Aubaret had opposed the cession and had submitted a plan known as the “Aubaret plan,” which would have given France only Saigon and the mouth of the river and a protectorate over the six provinces already conquered. In December 1863, an Annamite embassy headed by Phan-than-Giang left for Paris to lay the matter before the Emperor Napoleon III. Aubaret accompanied this mission and defended his plan before the French government. The case was not at all hopeless. A considerable party in France was opposed to any intervention in distant countries. Others, including Napoleon III and many of his ministers, were deeply interested in the Maximilian affair in Mexico, which had just suffered a serious check. That expedition had cost an enormous amount of money, and many of the expansionists were in favor of sacrificing Cochin China for the largest indemnity they could get. In his speech from the throne on November 6, 1863 Napoleon III felt it necessary to apologize for these distant expeditions and to explain that they were not premeditated.¹⁰ Phan-than-Giang, with Aubaret’s assistance, pleaded his case before the Emperor and was sent back to Annam with the promise that the treaty would be modified in accordance with his wishes.¹¹ He arrived at Saigon on March 18, 1864.¹²

Before leaving for France, Aubaret, as Chief Inspector of Native Affairs, had helped to prepare the treaty of August 11, 1863 with Norodom in which France's Protectorate over Cambodia was recognized. Aubaret favored a mild joint protectorate of France and Siam over Cambodia, similar to that later incorporated in his treaty. It was he, who, first and almost alone among French officials in Indo-China, favored the recognition of Siam’s claim to Battambang and Angkor.¹³ This caused a break between him and Admiral Lagrandière, and he was soon succeeded as aide-de-camp and Chief Inspector of Native Affairs by Naval Lieutenant Adrian (Henri) Rieunier, a young man of quite different ideas.

While in Paris Aubaret was appointed Chargé at Hué and Consul at Bangkok and was instructed to negotiate treaties in both places which would embody his views. This was a complete victory for Aubaret. He brought back the modified Annamite treaty as well as the ratified Cambodian treaty, which he seems to have taken to Paris. From Singapore he sent the treaties to Saigon, while a few days later he took the packet boat Entrecasteaux to Bangkok to deliver an autographed letter from the Emperor to the King of Siam. He arrived at Bangkok on April 14, 1864 and was received with great pomp by the King and officials the next day.¹⁴ Phya Montrey Sorivong, great diplomat and brother of the Kralahom, took the Entrecasteaux to Saigon on his way to Oudong, where he was to represent Siam at the official coronation of Norodom as King of Cambodia. When Aubaret had finished his task at Bangkok, he passed on to Saigon, where he was very coldly received by Admiral de Lagrandière, who was now Governor of Cochin China.¹⁵ He continued on to Hué on the Entrecasteaux, where he was received with great acclaim and was permitted to sit on the throne steps, an honor never before accorded to a foreigner.¹⁶ But negotiations soon stalled, because the Annamites had no money and made objections to paying a larger indemnity. Fighting still continued in some places, and it was beginning to become evident, even to Aubaret, that King Tuduc was playing for time, when orders came from Paris to suspend negotiations.

The Marquis de Chasseloup-Laubat, Minister of the Marine, and Rigault de Genouilly had continued to fight for the annexation of the provinces, and, late in 1864, Admiral Lagrandière sent Lieutenant Rieunier to Paris to plead their cause.¹⁷ He did this so well that, in January 1865, after studying the report of the Minister of the Marine, Napoleon III sent word to Aubaret announcing his definitive refusal to accede to the offers of repurchase made by the Annamites.¹⁸ Thus the annexation party finally won, and France remained in Cochin China. It is to this small group, and perhaps chiefly to Admiral Lagrandière, that is due the permanent establishment of France’s empire in Indo-China at this time. The chief opponent of that policy, among the officials of Indo-China, was Gabriel Aubaret, who, as has been seen, had now lost his case in Annam. The treaty of June 5, 1862 and the annexation of the three provinces remained unchanged.

AUBARET AND THE TREATY OF APRIL 14, 1865 WITH SIAM 

When he received the ratified Cambodian treaty of August 11, 1863, Captain Ernest Doudart de Lagrée, who had been made French Resident in Cambodia, solemnly proclaimed the French Protectorate on April 12, 1864 (two days before Aubaret’s arrival at Bangkok) and put it into immediate operation. The date of June 3, 1864 was set for the coronation of Norodom. A protocol was arranged by which the coronation was to be carried out by representatives of the King of Siam and the Governor of Cochin China, in the presence of the French Resident. As we have seen, Montrey Sorivong was sent from Bangkok for the occasion. Admiral de Lagrandière sent his Chief of Staff, Captain Désmoulins to represent him.

All these concessions to Siam angered the French officials in Indo-China, who had supported the treaty with Annam and were responsible for that with Cambodia — Lagrandière, Doudart de Lagrée, Rieunier, and others. To them, Siam’s claims in the matter could be disregarded. France had succeeded to the rights of Annam in Cambodia, and Cambodia had accepted the French Protectorate. To them, Siam had nothing to do with the coronation and had no just claims on Battambang and Angkor, which could be reintegrated into Cambodia at will. This group accused Aubaret of misrepresenting at the French court the true situation in Indo-China, of exaggerating the rights of Siam and the danger of offending her.²⁰ Siam took full advantage of the situation. Montrey Sorivong had been in Europe on a diplomatic mission, had met Napoleon III and had learned about the dissensions at the French court. After the coronation, to the surprise of the French and without any provision for it in the protocol, Montrey Sorivong read a memorandum, in Siamese, in which he reviewed Siam's relations with Cambodia and reaffirmed that country's claims to Battambang and Angkor.

A few weeks later, Admiral Lagrandière and his partisans in Indo-China were greeted with another surprise when they read in the August 20, 1864 issue of the Straits times of Singapore, that Siam had concluded a secret treaty with Norodom on December 1, 1863, giving Siam a protectorate over Cambodia practically equivalent to that granted to France by the treaty of August 11, 1863. In this secret treaty, Cambodia was said to be tributary to Siam and Norodom was called "Viceroy." Siam's claim was affirmed to Battambang and Angkor and other Cambodian territory in Siam's possession; and even Pursat and Kompong Svai were to remain in Siamese hands until the Siamese had been given complete satisfaction.²² Apparently at this time Siam was depending on the opposition of the French court to the expenditure of lives and money on such distant ventures. It is practically certain that Montrey Sorivong had convinced Norodom, in order to persuade him to sign the secret treaty, that France would soon withdraw from Indo-China.

The publication of the secret treaty was embarrassing to the French annexationists and put another argument into the hands of their opponents. To satisfy the opposition in Paris, it was now necessary to come to terms with Siam or to abandon the field. Siam must have known that it could not prevent France from exercising its Protectorate over Cambodia; but, having asserted its claim to Battambang and Angkor and knowing of the dissensions at the French court, Siam guarded — and even paraded — the secret treaty for its bargaining value at the council board. The price of its renunciation was to be the recognition of Siam's claim to Battambang and Angkor. The most bitter pill to Admiral Lagrandière and his followers was that Consul Aubaret, who had proposed a joint protectorate over Cambodia in 1863 and had favored the satisfaction of Siam's claims at the French court the next winter,²⁴ was authorized to make a treaty which would satisfy his own views and Siam’s demands. And the Consul was not under the control of the Admiral-Governor of Cochin China.

It should be noted, however, that although Aubaret was generally willing to admit many of Siam’s claims regarding Cambodia, he was disillusioned by what he considered the treachery of the secret treaty. After obtaining details of the treaty, he demanded, late in September 1864, an explanation from the Kralahom (Siamese Prime Minister). An exchange of views between Aubaret and the Kralahom indicated that Siam was willing to make changes in the treaty. Aubaret reported to Paris on October 5, 1864, and in January 1865 he was sent additional instructions authorizing him to negotiate with Siam for the abrogation of the secret treaty.

In April 1865 Consul Aubaret — who was also Chargé d’affaires at Hué — was back in Bangkok to resume negotiations. He seems to have come up from Saigon on the gunboat Mitraille, which arrived April 9.²⁶ On April 14, he signed a treaty with Phya Sorivong.²⁷ As we shall see later, there has been a great deal of confusion about this treaty in the minds of some Americans who have written on the subject.²⁸ This treaty is not found in any of the collections, because it was never ratified by the French government and thus never was put into force. Its provisions, as stated by Colonel Bernard, are as follows (according to the author’s translation):

²⁴ Aubaret's treaty of 1865 with Siam meant practically a joint protectorate. According to Cultru (p. 110), Lagrandière practically accuses Aubaret of abandoning Battambang and Angkor to Siam at Paris, which he later did in his treaty.

²⁵ R. Stanley Thomson, "Siam and France 1863-1870," Far Eastern quarterly, 5 (Nov. 1945), 28-31.

Article V. The kingdom of Cambodia is recognized free and independent. This kingdom is not subjected to any suzerainty and remains thus placed between French possessions on one side and the kingdom of Siam on the other. However, and in consideration of ancient customs, His Majesty the King of Cambodia will have the right to render homage to His Majesty the King of Siam at the same time as to His Majesty the Emperor of the French, but it is well understood that this homage is only a mark of respect, which does not affect in any way the perfect independence of Cambodia. If His Majesty the King of Cambodia desires, as in the past, to send presents to His Majesty the King of Siam, the French government will not interpose any obstacle. This government will not oppose in any way the friendly relations Cambodia may desire to entertain with Siam.

Article VI. The princes of Cambodia being accustomed to reside in the kingdom of Siam, the French government will not prevent it in the future; and if these princes wish to live in French territory, the Siamese government will not oppose it in any fashion.

Article VII. The French government engages to make the Cambodians observe all the clauses contained in the various articles of the present arrangement.

As may easily be seen, this treaty shows the marks of Consul Aubaret's ideas. Siam recognized the French Protectorate over Cambodia and declared its secret treaty null and void. In exchange, France ratified Siam's claim, not only to Battambang and Angkor, but to all other territory taken by Siam from Cambodia and Laos — Mlu Prey, Tonlé Repu, Stung Treng, and "Siamese Laos" — even, temporarily at least, to Pursat and Kompong Svai, which Siam had never before held,³⁰ but which Norodom had offered his former godfather, if Mongkut would protect the rest of his territory from the Annamites and the French.³¹ Mongkut was obviously unable to keep this promise and instead of trying to keep it, he was now treacherously despoiling his friend of a large part of that territory as a reward for recognizing France's suzerainty over the rest of it.

Moreover, after asserting France's Protectorate over Cambodia, the treaty proceeded to annul it (1) by declaring Cambodia free and independent (Art. V), and (2) by permitting Siam (a) to receive homage from Cambodia (Art. V) and (b) to continue to hold its princes as hostages (Art. VI). It is difficult to see why a representative of a European power, which was able to impose its will, would make such a one-sided treaty against the apparent interests of its client, even abandoning the interests of its protégé in favor of those of its opponent. The answer is to be found in the personal ideas of Aubaret, backed by the opposition of the antiexpansionists in Paris and probably, to some degree, in the fear of complications with Great Britain.

RECEPTION OF THE "AUBARET TREATY"

Such was the famous "Aubaret treaty," which is seldom quoted or read, and which appears here, it is believed, for the first time in a publication in English in the United States. Landon states that it was ratified in 1867.³² As will be seen later, the "Aubaret treaty" was never ratified and was replaced by the treaty of 1867, which was negotiated in Paris and signed by the Marquis de Moustier for France and two Siamese ambassadors for Siam. It is, therefore, difficult to see how the mere appearance of the French gunboat Mitraille at Bangkok in April 1865 "forced" or "persuaded" Siamese diplomats in Paris to sign a treaty in 1867, as Landon seems to intimate.³³ The four articles which Landon quotes without identifying the treaty from which they came except to call it a "new treaty" and without giving his source are not from the "Aubaret treaty" and thus can be only remotely connected with the appearance of a French gunboat at Bangkok in April 1865.

The Siamese king and officials do not seem to have objected to the "Aubaret treaty." It was very favorable to them, and official relations up to that time between France and Siam do not seem to have been lacking in cordiality. The use of a small gunboat to transport an official was neither alarming nor unusual in a region and at a period when regular passenger communications were limited,³⁴ and the visit of a gunboat was not alarming unless accompanied by threats. But the British, whose influence had been growing at the Siamese court, made all the capital they could out of the affair. From Montigny to Aubaret, the French had been poorly represented at Bangkok, and their influence had declined accordingly. On the other hand, the British had greatly extended their influence.³⁵ Besides their being generally well represented in Bangkok, Sir John Bowring, who had negotiated the British treaty of 1855, was now a sort of ambassador-at-large for Siam in Europe, and Mrs. Anna Leonowens, a young British widow from Singapore, who was governess of the children of King Mongkut, sometimes served as a secretary for the king in his European correspondence. An American medical missionary, Dan Beach Bradley, was one of the king’s physicians and had just started one of the first newspapers in Siam. Both Mrs. Leonowens and Dr. Bradley seem to have been very anti-French and, with the British Consul, Knox, and the Kralahom (who had had trouble with the French in Cambodia and had been responsible for the secret treaty) were looking for every opportunity to discredit the French.

These people began the attack on Aubaret even before the treaty was made, and when its provisions were supposed to be secret. There is nothing in the writings of Mrs. Leonowens, Dr. Bradley, or any of their followers to indicate that any of them had the slightest intimation of Aubaret's real character or his real mission in Bangkok. On April 9, 1865, Bradley entered in his Journal: "The French man-of-war 'Mistraille' [sic] came in the morning producing quite a panic as she came to compel the Siamese Government to abandon their last treaty with the Cambodian King"³⁶ (italics mine). The Aubaret treaty appeared promptly in Brad-ley's recently established newspaper, with some uncomplimentary remarks, against which the sensitive and meticulous Aubaret promptly protested to King Mongkut.³⁷ This seems to have been the beginning of the campaign of abuse against Aubaret, which was continued in the Bradley Journal and in Mrs. Leonowens' writings³⁸ and has been recently revived by Kenneth P. Landon and Margaret Landon,³⁹ but of which there seems to be little evidence of Siamese participation at the time.

It must be noted, however, that when Aubaret had departed for France after negotiating the treaty, a "brochure uncomplimentary to him had circulated under the title 'a memorandum relating to the conduct of Monsieur G. Aubaret, the consul of H. I. M., the Emperor of the French at Bangkok.' The authorship of this document was ascribed by the acting [French] consul to the pro-British party of the Kralahom and the instigation to its publication to the English consul."⁴⁰ In fact, all the charges against Aubaret can be traced to the Kralahom or the British faction, or at least so claimed the French, and it seems to be true. The Kralahom's motives seem to have been to tire the French by drawing out negotiations and by playing on the party in Paris opposed to expansion in Indo-China, until France withdrew altogether from the peninsula. At first this did not seem at all unreasonable.⁴¹ The British faction naturally assisted with their propaganda.

This projected treaty was signed by Aubaret and Phya Sorivong and sent to Paris for ratification. Aubaret also returned to Paris. When the news reached Saigon, it created a sensation. Lagrandière and Doudart de Lagrée, who had not been consulted nor even informed in advance, were furious. To them, the French Protectorate was a fait accompli, and the ultimate recovery of the "lost provinces" was a certainty.⁴² They saw no necessity for a treaty of any kind with Siam.

At the beginning of 1866, Doudart de Lagrée made a report to the Ministry of the Marine,⁴³ in which he gave a historical sketch of the territorial changes, in opposition to Aubaret's project and in reply to Montrey Sorivong's memorandum read at the coronation of Norodom (see above notes 20 and 21). The disputed territory fell into several groups, each with a different history: (1) Battambang and Angkor had been granted about 1795 as a fief to a Cambodian minister named Ben, who had changed his allegiance to Siam. It had been governed as a fief by the family of Ben, under Cambodian laws and customs, and had always been settled almost exclusively by Cambodians. (2) The provinces of Mlu Prey, Tonlé Repu, Stung Treng, and Basak, in northeastern Cambodia, had been conquered by Siam in consequence of a revolt of their governors, in 1810-15. This region was the cradle of the Khmer people and was inhabited by Cambodians, with a considerable indigenous Kha (Indonesian) population, in the hills, and a large Laotian population, which had recently come down from the north. (3) Pursat and Kompong Svai were Siam's price for returning Norodom to the throne after this brother Votha had driven him out of Cambodia in 1861-62. Kompong Svai was east of Angkor on the north of the lake. Pursat was east of Battambang at the south, almost to Oudong. They were administered through those two provinces, and thus the objections to Article IV of the Aubaret treaty (which recognized the boundaries "as they exist on the day of signing") by the French officers in Indo-China who understood the situation.

The meaning of "Siamese Laos" in Aubaret's treaty was enigmatical. The ancient Laotian kingdom of Lan Chang (1353-1707) had been divided, in 1707, into Luang Prabang and Vientian. Siam had conquered Vientian in 1827-32 and had carried most of the inhabitants of the east side of the river into captivity on the west side, now known as Siamese Laos, or to the Ménam valley, nearly depopulating it except for the Kha population of the mountains. None of this territory had ever been inhabited by Siamese, and only the southwestern part of it had ever been incorporated as a part of Siam or brought under Siamese law or administration.⁴⁵ The mention of Chieng-Mai as being in Siamese Laos, as Thomson⁴⁶ says Aubaret did in the discussion, shows their confusion of mind on this subject, as Chieng-Mai was the capital of the old Yun kingdom of Lan-na, which did not adjoin Cambodia and, consequently, was not in the "Siamese Laos" covered by the treaty. In fact, Lan-na was the only part of Siam which was never under Khmer rule and to which Cambodia never had any claim whatever. Although the Siamese call, or used to call, this region West Laos and called the inhabitants Laotians, the Yuns are not genuine Laotians, being much mixed with Lawas, Karens and Mons, who had a kingdom there — Haripunjai⁴⁷— long before the territory was over-run and conquered, first probably by Tai from the upper Mékong and later by Laotians proper.⁴⁸

The French Foreign Office read the Aubaret treaty and the Doudart de Lagrée report and heard the arguments on both sides. Although Aubaret defended the use of the term "Siamese Laos," the Foreign office rejected the,treaty (Bernard says chiefly because it did not understand what was meant by "Siamese Laos")⁴⁹ and instructed Aubaret to resume negotiations. Aubaret returned to Bangkok in June 1866 and again took the matter up with the Kralahom and his brother; but the British faction at Bangkok, among whom must be numbered Dr. Bradley, had been very active against the French and had raised considerable opposition to Aubaret. Taking advantage of this, the Siamese government asked that negotiations be transferred to Paris.⁵⁰ Montrey Sorivong had learned in Paris about dissensions at the French court and had taught the Siamese to play French politics.

As we have seen, Siam was not forced to renounce the secret treaty with Cambodia. Rather, Aubaret went there in accordance with his own wishes and to satisfy the opposition in Paris, and, after he arrived he found that he had to secure the nullification of a treaty (the validity of which was doubtful) at the very high price of endorsing Siam's claims not only to Battambang and Angkor and the northeastern provinces and "Siamese Laos" (to all of which Siam's claim was very weak), but even to Pursat and Kompong Svai (which were then an integral part of Cambodia and had never before been even claimed by Siam). The Aubaret treaty of April 14, 1865 was so ridiculously favorable to Siam that the French Foreign Office did not present it for ratification. Dr. Bradley, who presumably made the entry in his Journal at the time the event happened, may be excused for thinking that the Mitraille came to “compel” the Siamese government to abandon the Cambodian treaty; but Landon, writing 76 years later, should have known that it did not “force” the Siamese government to do anything, because the Aubaret treaty was never ratified. The treaty by which Siam annulled its secret treaty with Cambodia was, at Siam’s request, negotiated and signed in Paris. The price paid to Siam for renouncing the secret treaty was much less than that offered in the Aubaret treaty, as may be seen by comparing the two documents; but it was still ridiculously high.

THE TREATY OF JULY 15, 1867

After some negotiations, a new treaty was signed at Paris on July 15, 1867, by Marquis Léonel de Moustier, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and two Siamese ambassadors.⁵¹ Siam recognized the French Protectorate over Cambodia and annulled its secret treaty of December 1, 1863. France recognized Siam’s title to Battambang and Angkor omitting the objectionable clause of Article IV of the Aubaret treaty and simply provided for their delimitation as well as that of “other Siamese provinces adjoining Cambodia as they are recognized in our day.” Siam renounced all tribute, presents, or other marks of vassality over Cambodia, and the ambiguous clause of the Aubaret treaty about the freedom and independence of Cambodia (which practically annulled the French Protectorate) was omitted. France guaranteed Cambodia’s observance of the treaty. There were some provisions not found in the Aubaret treaty. The Mékong, and all its tributaries in Siamese territory were to be open to the navigation of French vessels. Freedom of travel and trade were to be reciprocal. Cambodians in Siam were to be subject to the jurisdiction of the country, and vice versa. This treaty was, then, much less favorable to Siam than the Aubaret treaty, which annulled France’s Protectorate over Cambodia (and at the same time asserted it) and declared Cambodia free and independent (while at the same time asserting its vassalage to both France and Siam).

Yes, the treaty of July 15, 1867 was a perfidious agreement, and Aubaret was probably chiefly responsible for its perfidy; for the objectionable parts first appeared in the treaty of April 14, 1865, negotiated by him, and were later adopted by the treaty of July 15, 1867, and he alone of all the prominent French officials of Indo-China advocated them. But the perfidy was not the spoliation of Siam by France, as Landon and others have tried to make us believe, but the joint spoliation by France and Siam of Cambodia. Even Norodom who in 1862 had been willing to give these provinces and others to Siam for Siam's aid to protect him from France, now objected to the perfidious deal by which Siam received a guaranteed title to the purely Cambodian territory of Battambang and Angkor, in return for Siam's recognition of France's Protectorate over the remainder of Cambodia,⁵² which protectorate had been in full operation for more than three years without Siam's recognition. Cambodia, not Siam, was the victim of the treaty of July 15, 1867. Siam was the chief beneficiary.